“Syria: The Reconciliation of the ‘Foreigners Camp’ – A Return to 2018”

In a scene reminiscent of the early years of the Syrian revolution, when armed groups were vying for influence in the country’s northwest, the region recently witnessed a meeting reviving the traditional style of “reconciliation” between factions, which was common between 2012 and 2018.

This meeting comes after a long absence, amidst the dominance of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham over Idlib and its surroundings, following its recent victories over groups like the “Suqour al-Sham” and “Ahrar al-Sham” in Jabal al-Zawiya, and the removal of the “Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement” from the areas of the Syrian National Army in Afrin. This return to old mediation mechanisms reveals underlying rifts in the region, where the ambitions of jihadist formations with a foreign character clash with the efforts of the new transitional administration in Damascus to assert central control.

On the evening of last Thursday, October 23, 2025, leaders and representatives of jihadist groups met in a mediation session to settle the dispute between the “Foreigners Brigade”, run by the French-Senegalese Omar Diaby (also known as Omar Oumsin), and the internal security units in Harem. Tensions peaked in the western and northern neighborhoods of Idlib city, home to foreign migrants, and spread to Jisr al-Shughur, Al-Fu’ah, and Kafriya, passing through scattered areas in the northern countryside of Idlib, reaching the border town of Harem. In this city, the “Foreigners” camp rises atop the eastern mountain, built as a defensive fortress controlling the main roads linking Harem to Darkush, via Sarmada, all the way to the strategic Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey.

According to the sole picture released from the session, the meeting was attended by prominent figures from foreign jihadist groups that have been partially integrated into the new military structure. Foremost among them was the commander of the military forces of the Islamic Party of Turkistan, known as “Zahed” or “Abu Muhammad Turkistan,” Brigadier Abdulaziz Dawood Khadaberdi, who commands the 82nd Division within the new Syrian Army.

Also present was the commander of the Uzbek migrants, Sheikh Abdulaziz Uzbek, who runs the “Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah” Brigade, one of the arms of the 82nd Division, accompanied by the military brigade commander “Saif al-Din Uzbek,” in addition to the Emir of Tajik fighters, Sheikh “Abu Anas,” alongside the representative of the Syrian Ministry of Defense “Abu Abdo Ta’oum,” a well-known military leader formerly in the Ali bin Abi Talib Brigade.

Foreign fighters form two main divisions in the new Syrian Army: the 82nd Division led by Abu Muhammad Turkistan, which includes Turkistani fighters and Syrian individuals close to them, and the 84th Division led by Brigadier Khaled Muhammad al-Halabi (Khaled Khattab), former leader of “Ansar al-Tawhid,” which includes Arab and foreign fighters such as French, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. Al-Halabi was granted the rank of brigadier by order of the commander of the Military Operations Administration on December 31, 2024.

The text of the agreement, signed by the sponsors, includes a cessation of confrontations and mobilization between the two sides – the internal security in Harem and the Foreigners Brigade – and an end to hostile media propaganda, with the dispute referred to the sharia judiciary in the Ministry of Justice.

The Turkistanis, Uzbeks, and Tajiks also pledged to monitor the case of Omar Oumsin at the Ministry of Justice, grant the Syrian government access to the camp, and withdraw heavy weapons to camps.

The agreement added a clause preventing the pursuit of any group or fighter who participated in the conflict, specifically referring to the Uzbek and Tajik migrants, who share the Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah Brigade and operate as independent battalions that have long formed the core of the brigade.

However, facts on the ground show that this arrangement may be a temporary mask for deeper tensions. The jihadist groups in Idlib are not easy entities; they carry a distinct ideological identity that makes integrating them a real challenge.

The eruption of the conflict with the “Foreigners” demonstrates the difficulty of the challenges facing the authority in Damascus with foreign fighters, expressing growing fears towards the central authority, more certain than before.

**Who is Omar Diaby?**

Omar Diaby, or “Oumsin,” represents a living example of these complexities. This French jihadist of Senegalese roots, born in France, was active in youth advocacy circles before moving to Syria with the start of the revolution in 2011.

There, he formed the “Foreigners Brigade”, a gathering of French-speaking foreign fighters from France, Belgium, and some African countries, settling in a camp near the city of Harem as a main center, away from the scrutiny of local authorities. Diaby was included in the UN international terrorism lists since 2014 and is considered one of the most prominent French-speaking jihadist spokesmen in the Syrian field.

His faction follows an isolated jihadist line, refusing to join local formations or commit to any official body, whether administrative or military, expressing a categorical rejection of political concessions.

Of course, Diaby has faced repeated accusations from local entities in Idlib, including detaining a French child, turning the area into a haven for foreign fighters outside the law, and possessing heavy weapons posing a potential security risk from the perspective of the Internal Security Directorate and Syrian intelligence. In response, Diaby rejects these claims, considering them the result of French intelligence interventions seeking to extradite him and end his jihadist role, in the context of settling old disputes.

In 2020, he was detained by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib and then released in 2022 under strict conditions, including avoiding armed activities, bringing in new fighters, or media appearances. Diaby’s journey reflects a complex pattern of links between foreign jihadist groups and local entities in Idlib, between efforts of security control and ongoing ideological differences.

Returning to more recent developments, on October 22, 2025, the region witnessed a wide security campaign launched by Syrian internal security units against the “Al-Ferdan” camp (or the French camp) in Harem, following complaints from camp residents about serious violations, including the detention of a French child from her mother. However, this case is old in the judiciary and does not constitute a sufficient reason to launch the attack, according to what the French Brigade published on its Telegram account.

The forces surrounded the camp, set up observation points, and sought to negotiate with Oumsin to surrender peacefully, but he fortified himself, and an exchange of fire occurred, while the Syrian authorities accused Oumsin of using civilians as human shields, according to official statements.

The complex situation in Idlib cannot be summarized by a temporary security agreement or a fleeting partial solution; it goes beyond the scope of administrative procedures. The “Foreigners brigade” is not just an armed unit that can be incorporated by a swift political decision; it is an interconnected structure comprising foreign fighters from France and Belgium, supported by transnational links and expertise in recruitment from Europe, alongside a jihadist intellectual foundation that contradicts the trends of local groups. On the other hand, the new Syrian government seeks to demonstrate its strength in extending control and reforming state institutions, describing the incidents as “an organized arrangement,” while in reality, it is a temporary solution that turns an intertwined security issue into a narrow criminal matter.

Nevertheless, the anxiety of foreign fighters continues to dominate the picture: How will the state deal with them during comprehensive reconstruction? What are the actual guarantees to avoid the file exploding again? The experience of the Foreigners Brigade proves that foreign jihadist groups in Idlib are not prepared for easy integration, as their members live in a camp near Harem, speak French fluently, and hold a jihadist vision that conflicts with any national or regional plan, making the issue go beyond surrendering weapons to rebuilding a fundamental relationship between the state and these entities.

Furthermore, between the state’s quest to strengthen its authority and the brigade’s desire to maintain its autonomy, the gap remains wide between the options of “integration” and “isolation.” What is happening in Harem now is not a decisive victory for anyone, but a temporary pause between an authority building an image of an organized entity and a foreign group that still considers itself outside the scope of full integration. On the other hand, this agreement revives larger issues, such as the issue of foreign fighters and the challenge of integration, and the stance of countries on repatriating their fighters or amnestying them. It is not unlikely that stirring the “Foreigners” issue is a way to test the waters for foreign fighters and their reaction if the transitional authority decides to dismantle one of the groups by force. Naturally, whatever the outcome or form of resolving the “Foreigners” issue, the administration of the legitimate president has sent a message to Europeans that it is working to reduce the threat of jihadists coming from their countries.

In conclusion, this reconciliation remains a witness to the fragility of balances in Syria, where ideological loyalties meet political necessities, and the state remains in a race against time to impose its authority without provoking new rebellions.

Source: Al-Fids Al-Arabi